A common misconception is that decoherence gives the eigenstates that we observe to be fairly definite about a subsystem (e.g., approximate eigenstates 
A question puzzling some of us scientists is why we our observations are fairly definite, and why what appears to us visually to be be fairly definite is usually something like approximate positions of objects that we see. One might say that what we see is presumably determined by the firings of neurons in the retinas at the backs of our eyes, so that a particular pattern of firings gives a visual impression of the locations of objects that we see. Then the question is why we are visually aware of a fairly definite pattern of retinal neuron firings. One might go on to say that this is because a fairly definite pattern of these retinal neuron firings induces a fairly definite pattern of neuron firings or some other property in some more central part of the brain where the visual awareness may be postulated to occur, but this just pushes the question back to why we are aware of those brain properties, rather than of superpositions of them. If we assume that for particular brain properties, there are corresponding visual awarenesses of objects that appear to have fairly definite positions, rather than of combinations of different positions, the question is then what is the preferred basis of states for the subsystem of these brain properties, such that each basis state leads mainly to a single definite visual awareness.
The mystery arises because in quantum theory, unitary evolution would almost always lead to a state of the brain subsystem that is a mixed state of the particular brain properties that each lead to fairly definite visual awarenesses. If the brain state in quantum theory is a mixed state of many brain properties, what picks out the particular brain states that each lead mainly to a fairly definite observation that one is aware of having? Or, if we assume that the process of vision maps the relative positional configuration of an observed object to a corresponding brain property, what picks out these particular states of the object (rather than superpositions of them) that each lead to a fairly definite visual awareness of the object? Observationally, these seem to be approximate position eigenstates of the object, but why is that true?
Traditionally it was postulated that the quantum state (of a closed system) not only has the unitary evolution of the Schrödinger equation, but that at certain times the unitary evolution is broken by the so-called "collapse of the wavefunction" to return it to a macroscopically definite quantum state [1] , such as an approximate position eigenstate of observed objects. This collapse was supposed to occur during measurements, but usually it was left rather vague what precisely constituted a measurement and exactly when the collapse of the wavefunction would occur.
More recently it has become widely recognized that quantum subsystems of the universe rapidly become entangled with their environments through generic interaction processes called decoherence, so that the subsystems are not in pure states but mixed states, described by density matrices or density operators that are not the unit-rank projection operators that are the density operators of pure quantum states [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] . It is sometimes assumed that it is the eigenstates of the density operator of a subsystem produced by decoherence (see, e.g., [3, 9, 11] , who use these eigenstates) that are the particular states of a subsystem that each lead to fairly definite visual awarenesses. For example, I got that impression from some recent statements of Raphael Bousso and Leonard Susskind [35] , in a paper that has several other interesting ideas whose truth or falsehood seems to be rather independent of how I interpreted their statements about decoherence. They wrote, To quantify how much mean uncertainty there is in a certain operator (e.g., for a macroscopic variable such as center-of-mass position) in a certain basis (e.g., the Schmidt basis), I shall define a dimensionless Mean Observable-Basis Uncertainty (MOBU) U OB as the ratio of the mean variance of the observable O (a hermitian operator) in a basis B = |i > (i = 1 . . . m) of m pure states for a quantum subsystem of Hilbert-space dimension n and with a mixed state given by the density operator ρ, to the full variance of the observable in the same mixed state. If B is the Schmidt basis, one has that m = n and that the |i are the orthonormal eigenvectors of the density operator, which can be written as ρ = n j=1 p j |j j| with nonnegative eigenvalues p j that sum to unity (and which are often interpreted to be the proba-bilities that the quantum subsystem is in each of the n pure states |j that are the orthonormal eigenvectors of the density operator). However, I shall give a general definition of the MOBU U OB for an arbitrary basis B, without even assuming that the m |i are orthonormal.
The full variance of the observable O in the (normalized) density matrix of the quantum subsystem is (∆O)
The variance in the pure state |i (not necessarily assumed to be normalized) is
Define the probabilities P i for the basis states |i , given the subsystem density operator ρ, to be P i ≡ r i /N with r i ≡ i|ρ|i / i|i being the relative probability for the basis state |i and with N ≡ m i=1 r i being the normalization factor, which will be unity if m = n and if the |i are orthogonal. For the Schmidt basis |j of m = n orthonormal eigenvectors of the density operator ρ, P j = r j = j|ρ|j = p j , but for a generic basis I shall reserve p j for the n eigenvalues of ρ and use P i for the probabilities of the m basis states |i .
Then the subsystem has a mean variance of the observable O in the basis B = |i that can be defined to be ( One can easily see that if there is no restriction on the basis (even if it is required to be an orthonormal basis of the same dimension n as the Hilbert space of the subsystem under consideration), then the MOBU can be any positive number (including infinity, if the observable has no full variance in the density operator of the subsystem). However, it is restricted to be no greater than unity for the Schmidt basis |i = |j , as I shall now show.
Assuming that B = |i > is the Schmidt basis of m = n orthonormal eigenstates of the density operator, which can then be written as ρ = m i=1 P i |i i| with nonnegative eigenvalues P i = p i that are the same as what was defined above to be the probabilities for these particular basis states, define the mean value of the observable O in the pure state |i to be O i ≡ i|O|i and the mean value in the full mixed 
Therefore, the Mean Observable-Basis Uncertainty is There has been an extensive study of quantum models in which a free particle or harmonic oscillator (which I shall take as the quantum subsystem of interest)
interacts linearly with a collection of other harmonic oscillators (which I shall call the environment; in some cases it may be taken to be a heat bath) [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42] . For simplicity, one often takes the initial density matrix for the whole It would also be interesting to calculate the MOBU for the more sophisticated 'pointer bases' that have been proposed [4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 23, 24, 28, 30, 44, 45, 46, 47] .
Although none of these have been precisely defined for a generic situation, they are variously described as "the eigenvectors of the operator which commutes with the apparatus-environment interaction Hamiltonian" and "contains a reliable record of the state of the system" [4] , the eigenstates of the observable of the apparatus "which is most reliably recorded by the environment" [5] , the states "which become minimally entangled with the environment in the course of the evolution" [24] , "the pure states least affected by decoherence" [28] , "states that produce the least entropy,"
"states that are the easiest to find out from the imprint they leave on the environment," "states that can be deduced from measurements on the smallest fraction of the environment," and as "states for which it takes the longest to lose a set fraction their initial purity" [45] . It is also admitted that "There is no a priori reason to expect that all of these criteria will lead to identical sets of preferred states," though it is "reasonable to hope that, in the macroscopic limit in which classicality is indeed expected, differences between various sieves should be negligible" [28] . I do suspect that often the MOBU for the position observable would be rather small for pointer bases that are suitably defined, but that remains to be calculated.
Because of the ambiguity of which of the many qualitative criteria to choose for pointer bases, and of how to make any of them precise, I do not think these many different ideas about pointer bases are the final answer to the question of how to explain our observations, though they do seem to be important steps in the right direction. To me it appears simplest to postulate that measures or probabilities for our observations are given by the expectation values of certain definite 'awareness operators,' but we do not yet know what they are and how the contents of our observations may correlate with these operators themselves [48, 49, 50] .
In conclusion, each fairly definite location that we observe visually for an object does not appear to have the form given by any of the eigenstates of the subsystem density operator after decoherence, at least for linearly interacting systems with gaussian density operators. So this simple-minded idea from decoherence (already criticized in [10, 23, 30] 
